SDA-2H: Understanding the Value of Background Cover Against Statistical Disclosure

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Abstract— The statistical disclosure attack (SDA) is an effective method for compromising the anonymity of users in a mix based system. Cover traffic, in the form of fake or dummy messages sent by other users of the mix, is an effective defense to make the task of the attacker difficult. Our aim is to examine the effect that background cover – the cover traffic sent by other users – has on the effectiveness of statistical disclosure attacks. Since the original SDA does not explicitly account for background traffic volumes, we developed an extension to the SDA called SDA-2H that uses this information to improve upon the SDA. Based on this attack, we are able to quantify the importance of background cover traffic, which we show in simulation to be effective in many scenarios.

Index Terms— online privacy, anonymous communications, statistical disclosure attack, background cover

I. INTRODUCTION

To ensure anonymity in online communication, Chaum introduced the concept of mixes in 1981 [1]. A mix can be understood as a node that acts as an intermediary between the sender and the receiver. It processes each packet of data before sending it to the recipient. This processing includes encrypting the data with the mix's public key (to be decrypted when it leaves the mix) as well as reordering the timing of the data packets (e.g. delaying the data packets) to obfuscate the path from sender to receiver. Using a set of mixes, a user can effectively stop an external eavesdropper from linking a receiver to a particular sender [2-4].

Despite the obvious advantages of mix networks in preserving anonymity, they are still vulnerable to a set of attacks. One set of such attacks are the intersection attacks (also referred to as partitioning or disclosure attacks). These perform traffic analysis by exploiting the fact that different messages use the same route through the network. They are particularly devastating because they do not rely upon any particular properties of mixing [5].

To mount these attacks, a passive eavesdropper observes a large volume of network traffic and relies on the assumption that a targeted sender (henceforth referred to as Alice) sends messages only to a limited number of recipients. Intersection attacks are designed based on correlating the times when senders and receivers are active. By observing which recipients received packets during the rounds when Alice was sending, the attacker can create a list of Alice's most frequent recipients, thereby thwarting her attempt at anonymity.

Though effective, the disclosure attack is computationally difficult and time consuming. The statistical disclosure attack (SDA) can be considered as an improvement on disclosure attacks. Unlike disclosure attacks, which involve heavy computation, SDA simply relies on performing simple operations over many observations [5-7]. The main question is how many *rounds* of observations are needed for the attacker to learn about Alice's sending behavior.

Users may attempt to make traffic analysis attacks like the SDA harder to perform by sending *cover traffic*, which consists of fake (dummy) messages that appear to be real messages and mask Alice's true sending activity. Mathewson and Dingledine showed the cover traffic is an effective defense against the SDA [7]. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the cover traffic that other users send has minimal effect on Alice's anonymity [8]. One might expect to find a difference between a scenario in which other senders greatly vary their cover traffic volume and when other senders do not use any cover traffic at all. The reason that it does not have an effect is that the SDA equation does not consider background traffic volume at all.

In this paper, we examine the value of background cover traffic as a defense against SDA. In particular, we extend the SDA into a modified attack that we call SDA-2H (SDA with Two Heads). In the SDA-2H, background traffic volumes are used. We have discovered that background traffic volumes can be used to estimate the amount of cover traffic that Alice sends, separately from the number of real messages that she sends. This allows the attacker to better estimate Alice's activity.

The paper is organized as follows: Related work is mentioned in (§II). (§III) provides background on SDA, mix types, and cover traffic. (§IV) explains our attacker model, SDA-2H. (§V) details the implementation and testing of our hypothesis. We summarize our contributions with an indication to the future work in (§VI).

II. RELATED WORK

Significant work was made in this area in 2004, when Mathewson and Dingledine extend previous work on SDA to show that even in a binomial mix with a non-global adversary, intersection attacks can still be successful, but may be made to require an extremely long period of observation [7]. They accomplish this in a manner similar

to ours: by varying the amount of background traffic and padding (cover traffic). Their findings confirm that to achieve the greatest anonymity, the delay ($pDelay$ in our models) must be highly varied, padding must be consistent, and the attacker must have a limited view of the network, with the inability to distinguish between times when the victim is active and not (*i.e.*, the victim rarely, if ever, goes offline, and consistently sends cover traffic).

Danezis et. al. have presented a model, TS-SDA "...that tries to uncover the receivers of messages sent through an anonymizing network supporting anonymous replies. [*e.g.*, Mix minion [9]]" [10]. The work proposes a linear approximation technique for predicting likely receivers, and demonstrates that TS-SDA's effectiveness exceeds that of SDA, since it considers the replies as well, hence a "two sided" attack. The linear approximation uses a complex weighting to decide the relationship of a message to Alice. (*i.e.*, did she initiate the conversation, or was she just replying to a larger group message?) Our technique would likely not apply, as it depends on a simple derivation of the total number of messages sent by the mix, which becomes a complex problem when senders double as receivers.

A much more recent intitative into SDA has been undertaken by Mallesh and Wright by viewing anonymous communication over the mix as two-way instead of the traditional one-way approach of SDA [11]. This attack, referred to by the authors as the reverse statistical disclosure attack (RSDA), is unique in its approach. The attacker basically applies the SDA attack to all users in a mix, thus observing which users Alice is sending messages to and which users are sending messages to Alice. By observing these two sets of information, the attacker can obtain a profile of Alice and locate contacts of Alice that may be missed by traditional SDA. This attack proves to be much more reliable and faster than SDA. Readers may note that Danezis et. al. [10] employ an attack which seems to have a similar two sided attack structure. However, the attack presented by Danezis differs from RSDA in that it is only interested in receivers to whom Alice initiates the message, while RSDA is interested in any contact of Alice, regardless of who initiated the conversation.

Our SDA-2H attack model was not addressed in any prior paper. SDA-2H incorporates an additional piece of information that previously was ignored – the relative volumes of incoming and outgoing traffic. By incorporating this information, the attack improves in some cases over SDA. Wright et. al. provides an analytical framework for the SDA and shows the benefits of RBC in analysis and simulation [12]. We expect that the same analytical methods might also be useful to study SDA-2H, but this is beyond the scope of the current paper. RBC could be helpful against SDA-2H, as it helps to hide the real outgoing message volumes. The RSDA looks at both sending and receiving. This is an additional source of information that is orthogonal to the relative volumes of incoming and outgoing traffic. It may also be interesting

to apply the SDA-2H method to RSDA.

Bagai et. al. have focused on using the weighted mean instead of the arithmetic mean of the observed relative receiver popularity and their mathematical analysis on the attack model verifies their claim of the attacker not being obstacled by the sender-generated dummy traffic [13]. Troncoso et. al. proposes the attack model [14] that gets able to work without any assumption on user behavior. Because of its ability of considering all users in a round at once, the attack model becomes highly effective in de-anonymizing the mixing rounds. But none of these works has analyzed the effect of background cover traffic on the attack model. Danezis et. al. evaluates an attack model that can be effectively used to gather information about certain sender and receiver [15], gaining significant flexibility as compared to other models with the additional power of providing error estimates with reliablity. But, the long term attacks usually abstract the internal functioning of the anonymity system and represent it as an opaque router; thus the attack model in [15] suffers from the limitation of operating as a very large threshold mix, in practice.

III. MIX NETWORKS AND THE STATISTICAL DISCLOSURE ATTACK

In this section, we give a brief background on mix networks, before describing the SDA in detail and the different types of cover traffic that can be used to combat traffic analysis.

A. Mixes

Mix networks are a common choice for implementing anonymous systems and remain an active area of research. As explained in [1] and our introduction, a mix is a very powerful tool for obtaining anonymity — though it is bound by a few constraints [2-4]. There are various kinds of mix models available. In this paper, we focus on threshold and binomial mix.

1) Threshold Mix: In the threshold mix model, a fixed number of messages, b, are collected. When the batch size is reached, all b messages are dispatched in a random order. Simply put, packets that enter in a given round will leave that round.

2) Binomial Mix: In the binomial mix model, the decision to either send the message in the current round, or delay until a later round is made by subjecting each incoming message to a coin toss with a bias probability, $pDelay$. As $pDelay$ approaches one, more messages are held in the mix, which makes correlating ingoing and outgoing messages difficult.

B. Statistical Disclosure Attack

SDA can be considered as an extension of intersection attacks, which function by analyzing the pattern of messages being sent from a particular user. These attacks are based on the fact that different messages are sent through the mix-based network using the same path.

SDA takes this furthur by assuming that a user (Alice) sends messages only to a limited set of recipients. By recording and comparing sending and receiving patterns for each round, an attacker can estimate Alice's most likely recipients by storing the cumulative probability that alice sends to any given recipient. SDA is based on long term observations and consists of relatively simple mathematical processing, thus it is cheap and easy to implement. The accuracy of SDA depends on the number of rounds observed, weighed agianst any defensive strategies in place (*i.e.*, more observations yield a greater chance of noticing a difference between Alice's sending pattern and the background; the use of cover traffic aims to make this period of time unacceptable to a prospective attacker by introducing error into the equation).

As mentioned in the introduction, SDA can also be considered as an extension to the disclosure attack described by Kesdogan [16]. The SDA equation is given as follows:

$$\bar{O} = \frac{\bar{m}\vec{v} + (\bar{n} - \bar{m})\vec{u}}{\bar{n}} \qquad (1)$$

where $\bar{O}$ is the mean of $\vec{o}$, a vector which records the probability that a given message was sent to each recipient; $\bar{m}$ and $\bar{n}$ are the average number of messages sent by Alice, and the average total number of messages sent (including Alice), in a round, respectively. The unknown sending behavior of Alice is denoted $\vec{v}$, and the likelihood that the background (everyone but Alice) sends to recipients, in the vector $\vec{u}$ (where each element $\vec{v}_i$ is the likelihood that Alice sends to recipient i and similarly for $\vec{u}$).

C. Cover Traffic

The cover traffic in a mix-based anonymity system consists of dummy messages that are added to the network along with the real messages transmitted by users of the network. Dummy messages serve as a useful tool to increase anonymity, since encryption inside the mix makes them indistinguishable from real messages (usually, until they are sent). The only option an attacker has is to account for all the messages into his observations, thus increasing the total number of messages sent by the user (which should make his work more difficult). Dummy messages can be classified into three types based on their origin:

- **User cover:** generated by the user Alice.
- **Background cover:** generated by senders other than Alice in the system.
- **Receiver-bound cover:** generated by the mix.

As our project centers on background cover, we now explain it in more detail.

D. Background Cover

Background cover is created when users (not part of the mix) generate dummies along with their real messages. As shown in [8], this can be very effective in confusing a naive attacker. The attacker sees more messages entering the mix, and expecting them to exit the mix, makes a miscalculation. This demands more rounds of observation, and doesn't threaten Alice's privacy in the near future. The protection provided by background cover, however, can be easily nullified by a well-informed attacker, who can simply estimate the average number of dummy messages, $\bar{d}$ (background cover) based on a simple equation:

$$\bar{d} \approx \bar{in} - \bar{out} \qquad (2)$$

where $\bar{in}$ is the mean number of messages entering the mix, and $\bar{out}$, the mean number of messages exiting the mix. Accounting for the percentage of background cover in their calculations; an attacker can virtually disregard the effect of background cover. It is proposed in [8] that an informed attacker can accurately estimate this percentage, thus reducing a receivers anonymity.

IV. Attacker Model (SDA-2H)

We now describe SDA with Two Heads (SDA-2H), an extension of the SDA that seeks to extract more information from the same set of observations that the SDA uses. The key intuition of SDA-2H is that the attacker can estimate how much of Alice's traffic is cover traffic based on the difference between the volume of incoming traffic and the volume of outgoing traffic. Prior work has shown that Alice cover provides an important protection against the [7,8]. If the attacker knows how much of Alice's traffic is cover traffic, the SDA can operate perfectly, as if Alice was not sending cover traffic at all.

Let us illustrate this with a simple numerical example. Suppose that, in a given round, the background senders transmit 100 messages (all real messages) and Alice sends ten messages. Thus 110 messages reach the mix. The attacker observes that 105 messages leave the mix in that round. Since the attacker knows that the difference between the number of messages entering and leaving the mix is five, he can easily infer that Alice sent five cover messages and five real messages. Thus, the attacker can remove the effect of Alice cover.

More generally, the attacker needs to obtain $\bar{O}$ to use in Equation 1 and does so by knowing the delay policy and observing the number of messages entering and exiting the mix. The number of Alice's messages exiting the mix is denoted as n_{Alice}, with the other outgoing messages stored as $n_{Background}$. The set of recipients is represented by $\vec{r}$, which contains an element for every one of the mix's recipients such that $\vec{r}[i]$ is a count of the messages received by the ith recipient on a given round. This allows for updating the value of $\bar{O}$ as follows:

$$\bar{O}[i] = \frac{\vec{r}[i] * n_{Alice}}{n_{Alice} + n_{Background}} \qquad (3)$$

However, Mallesh et al. showed that dummies sent into the mix can be calculated by an informed attacker [8]. The improvement that SDA-2H provides is to consider that if the actual background traffic is known (say B_{Real}), and Alice's ingoing messages to the mix are represented as A_{Total}, then in, (for Equation 2), can be easily derived

as $in = A_{Total} + B_{Real}$. At the same time, Alice's cover is computed as $A_{Cover} = in - out$, which combines to derive Alice's actual number of messages, $A_{Real} = A_{Total} - A_{Cover}$. The more accurate value of A_{Real} is then used in place of n_{Alice} in Equation 3.

V. SIMULATION AND RESULTS

To evaluate the effectiveness of SDA-2H, we have extended the simulation environment used by Nayantara Mallesh in her investigation of SDA. We refer the reader to her papers for additional details [8,11].

The basic model of the simulation is of a single mix that receives and sends messages in rounds. In each round, the user of interest (Alice) sends message to a subset of her contacts; the number of messages is selected from a geometric distribution. She distributes messages to her contacts evenly. The other users (the background) send messages according to a normal distribution with a standard deviation of 10% of the mean number of messages sent per round. The senders select recipients according to a scale-free model, chosen to be similar to a social network, with more popular receivers getting more messages.

In our simulation, we study threshold and binomial mixes. In a sense, a binomial mix can be seen as a rough approximation of a pool mix, following the work of both Mallesh and Wright [8] and Mathewson and Dingledine [7] (both of whom describe their simulations as being on a pool mix, which was not correct [11]).

For threshold mix, we have simulated for batch size, $b = [5, 25, 125]$, and for each batch size the number of total recipients, N, and the number of Alice's recipients, m, are varied. In this case, we have simulated for $N = [16, 4096, 65536]$ and $m = [1, 4, 16, 64]$. We have simulated a total of 30 combinations (Not 36, as $N > m$) of these parameters. For each combination, we have simulated 100 runs.

In our simulation for threshold mix, the number of Alice's real messages and Alice cover are chosen from a trivial distribution (with a single element of probability 1). In this case, subtracting the total number of Alice's messages from batch size, we get the number of total messages from background senders. If r_b is the number of real background messages, and p is the percentage of background cover traffic, we get the total background messages, $M_b = r_b + r_b \times (\frac{p}{100})$.

For binomial mix, we have simulated for different values of background messages, that follow a normal distribution with mean in the range from 100 to 10000 and a standard deviation of 10% of the mean number of messages sent per round.. Average real messages per round from Alice (Geometric) are varied through choosing the values: $[0.1, 0.3, 0.6, 0.9]$ and this value is 0.6 for the experiments when it remains fixed. We have chosen the values: $[0.1, 0.3, 0.6, 0.9]$ for varying average dummy messages per round from Alice ($pDummy$) and 0.6 for the experiments where $pDummy$ remains constant.

Figure 1.   Attacker's Probability of Success ($b = 125, N = 4096$)
[Non-dynamic,Threshold mix]

For both types of mixes, we have simulated for dynamic background cover that vary in the ranges of $[1 - 10]\%, [45-55]\%, [80-120]\%$ and $[160-240]\%$. The percentages of non-dynamic background cover that we have simulated for: $[10\%, 25\%, 50\%, 100\%, 200\%, 300\%]$.

Our primary metric is the number of rounds until the attacker is successful. We generally say that the attacker is successful, and stop a given run of the simulation, when he correctly identifies 25% of Alice's recipients (when total Alice's recipients is greater than 20). For Alice's recipients in the range between 10 to 20, the attacker has to identify 50% of Alice's recipients and for total Alice's recipients less than 10, the attacker gets successful if it successfully identifies all the recipients of Alice. While this is an arbitrary amount, it provides a good indicator of when the attacker has learned a substantial amount of Alice's sending behavior. In measuring the attacker's success, we define a *granularity* of sampling. Rather than checking to see if the attacker is successful every round, we check every ten rounds. Sometimes, the attacker is not successful for a very long time. We set a cutoff value of $Max = 10^6$ rounds, after which we stop the simulation and say that the attacker took 10^6 rounds, which is effectively a failure for most realistic scenarios.

A. Evaluation for Threshold Mix

1) Non-dynamic Background Cover Traffic: Let n_r denote the total number of simulation-runs and n_s refer to the number of runs when the attacker successfully identifies the required number of Alice's recipients. So, $\frac{n_s}{n_r}$ gives us the measure for the probability of success of the attacker. Our simulation results show that SDA-2H can correctly measure Alice-Cover. In this case, from figure 1 we find that without any background cover the attacker's probability of success is 1, as expected. Our results for threshold mix show, even when we vary the batch size or total number of recipients; this probability remains unchanged.

The addition of non-dynamic background cover (without attacker adjustment) greatly reduces the potency of our attack model and shows promising results for Alice.

SDA does not accurately account for background cover. SDA-2H inherits this weakness, so adding non-dynamic background cover greatly upsets the attacker's calculations, in agreement with our hypothesis. From figure 1, we find that adding background cover of just 10% reduces the attacker's probability of success to *zero*. Increasing background cover is superfluous, as the attacker's probability of success continues to be *zero* in these cases.

In our results, we have found some exceptions that the attacker identifies Alice's recipients with very low probability (see table I). Our results (table I) show that 0.30 is the maximum probability that an attacker is successful. For $N = 16$, the attacker fails to identify Alice's recipients when non-dynamic background cover is added.

From the results-set of Table I, we find that when Alice's recipient set is relatively large ($m = 64$), the attacker meets our success criteria. In fact, as a rule (with that exception), the changes in the number of Alice's recipients, the total number of recipients and the batch size do not have a significant impact on the probability of attacker's success.

So, adding non-dynamic background cover (without attacker adjustment) introduces a considerable improvement to make the threshold mix resilient against SDA-2H attacker model, and a modest addition of 10% is sufficient for background cover to prove effective. But in our simulation with attacker-adjustment for threshold mix, results show that the attacker gets successful to identify Alice's recipients with probability 1.

In our simulation for threshold mix (without any background cover), we have found that for $N = 4096$ and 65536, the attacker needs only 100 rounds to successfully identify Alice's recipients, except for $b = 125, m = 64$ and $N = 4096$; in which the (median) number of rounds taken for a successful attack is 400. Without any background cover, for $N = 16$, the number of rounds taken by the attacker varies with the change of b and m (figure 2). From figure 2, we find that for $m = 4$, the number of rounds for the attacker to be succeeded increases significantly with the increase in batch size.

From our simulation results, we have figured out that when attacker-adjustment is done, the number of rounds taken by the attacker is almost same as that for no back-


Figure 2.   Number of Rounds ($N = 16$) [No background cover,Threshold mix]

ground cover. So, doing attacker adjustment articulately neutralizes the effect of adding non-dynamic background cover traffic.

2) Dynamic Background Cover: For dynamic background cover without attacker adjustment, we have found that the attacker's success rate is *zero* in threshold mix. So, when we do attacker-adjustment, we have actually made SDA-2H more powerful by giving it the power to approximate the percentage of background cover. In this case, we find that the results come with dramatic changes; the attacker's success rate is consistently 1. Our results show that varying the range of dynamic background cover, batch size, number of Alice's recipients, or total number of recipients, does not have an impact on this probability.

In our attacker adjustment, it is assumed that the attacker has knowledge about the range of dynamic background cover traffic and its approximation on background cover is dependent on this knowledge. Our simulation results show that when the recipient set is small, (*i.e.*, $N = 16$), changes in the range of dynamic background cover have a impact on the number of rounds taken by the attacker. The minimum number of rounds taken by the attacker is 10, and the maximum number of rounds is around 600 in this case. But when the number of total recipients increases (consider, $N = 4096, 65536$), the changes in the range of dynamic background cover traffic and the value of b and m do not significantly affect the number of rounds the attacker takes to be successful and it usually takes less than or equal to 100 rounds to successfully identify Alice's recipients.

Hence, we can deduce for threshold mix that when the attacker doesn't account for background cover traffic, adding non-dynamic background cover makes our system robust against the attacker; but after attacker-adjustment, the attacker successfully identifies Alice's recipients even when we make the background cover traffic dynamic.

B. Evaluation for Binomial Mix

We now present the results of our simulations.

Our results show that when the value of background messages(mean) is greater than 200, the attacker gets

TABLE I.
ATTACKER'S PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS FOR NON-DYNAMIC (N-D) BACKGROUND COVER (BCOVER) IN THRESHOLD MIX (WITHOUT ATTACKER-ADJUSTMENT)

b	N	m	N-D BCover	Probability of Success
5	4096	64	[100%, 200%]	0.17
5	4096	64	300%	0.25
25	4096	64	[200%, 300%]	0.16
5	65536	64	[100%, 200%]	0.30
25	65536	64	[25%, 100%]	0.25
25	65536	64	300%	0.17
125	65536	64	[10%, 200%]	0.17

success only for the ranges of $[1-10]\%$ and $[45-55]\%$ for dynamic background cover with attacker adjustment. The attacker fails for all the simulated ranges of dynamic background cover when the value of background messages(mean) is greater than or equal to 1000. But when the value of background messages(mean) is less than or equal to 200, the attacker gets success for all the simulated ranges of dynamic background cover with attacker adjustment. In these cases, the number of Alice's recipients is 64 and the number of total recipients is 65536.

We have also simulated for different values of Alice's recipients: $[1, 4, 16, 64]$ and total recipients: $[16, 4096, 65536]$. We have found that for [Alice's Recipients, Total Recipients] = $[1, 4096]$ and $[1, 65536]$, the attacker gets success for the ranges of $[1-10]\%$ and $[45-55]\%$, when the background messages(mean) is 1000. The attacker is also successful for the same ranges of dynamic background cover, when the background messages(mean) is increased to 1700 for [Alice's Recipients, Total Recipients] = $[1, 65536]$. But for background messages of 9000 and 10000 the attacker fails for any combination of Alice's recipients and total recipients.

For dynamic background cover without attacker adjustment the attacker gets success only for the range of $[1-10]\%$. When background messages(mean) is 100 the attacker gets success for all the simulated combinations of Alice's recipients and total recipients for this range. When the value of background messages(mean) is increased to 1000, the attacker only gets success for [Alice's recipients, Total recipients] = $[1, 4096]$ and $[1, 65536]$. For background messages(mean), greater than or equal to 1700, the attacker fails to identify Alice's recipients for dynamic background cover without attacker adjustment.

For non-dynamic background cover with attacker adjustment, the attacker successfully identifies Alice's recipients for any simulated values of background messages. For background messages(mean) of 125, the attacker gets success for 10% of non-dynamic background cover without attacker adjustment. But when the value of background messages (mean) is greater than or equal to 1000, the attacker fails for any simulated value of non-dynamic background cover without attacker-adjustment.

1) Effects of Varying Parameters: Figure 3 focuses on the effect of varying Alice's recipients and total recipients with the change in background messages(mean) when the percentage of non-dynamic background cover is 100% (with attacker-adjustment). Here we find that for a fixed number of total recipients, the number of rounds, the attacker needs to be succeeded increases with the increase in the number of Alice's recipients. The increases in the background messages makes it difficult for the attacker to be successful having total recipients and Alice's recipients unchanged. Our results show that when Alice's recipients remain unchanged and the number of total recipients increases, the attacker needs less number of rounds indeed, to successfully identify Alice's recipients.

In Figure 4, we get the results for varying average

Figure 3. Number of Rounds [Non-Dynamic BG Cover(100%),Binomial mix]


Figure 4. Number of Rounds [Non-Dynamic BG Cover(100%),Binomial mix]

Figure 5. Number of Rounds [BG = 500, Binomial mix]

real messages per round from Alice with the change in background messages(mean), when the percentage of non-dynamic background cover is 100% (with attacker adjustment). From Figure 4, we find that with the increase in the average real messages per round from Alice, the attacker needs less number of rounds to be successful. But with the increase in the background messages(mean), the number of rounds increases.

Figure 5 reflects the effectiveness of SDA-2H attack

Figure 6.   Number of Rounds [Binomial mix]

Figure 8.   Number of Rounds [BG = 500, Non-dynamic BG Cover[100%], Binomial mix]


Figure 7.   Number of Rounds [BG = 500, Binomial mix]

Figure 9.   Number of Rounds [BG = 500, Dynamic BG Cover[45-55]%, Binomial mix]

model that reduces the effect of dummy messages per round from Alice (Alice Cover). From the Figure we find that for $[1-10]\%$ and $[45-55]\%$ of dynamic background cover with attacker adjustment, varying Alice Cover does not have significant impact on the number of rounds taken by the attacker to be successful.

From Figure 6 we find the effect of varying background messages (mean) when the ranges of dynamic background cover (with attacker adjustment) are $[1-10]\%$ and $[45-55]\%$. The results show that the number of rounds for the attacker to get success increases with the increase in background messages. The number of rounds for dynamic background cover with the range $[45-55]\%$ is less than $[1-10]\%$ when the value of background messages(mean) is 100 but with the increases in background messages the attacker needs more number of rounds for $[45-55]\%$ of dynamic background cover in comparison to that of $[1-10]\%$.

Figure 7 focuses the effect of varying $pDelay$. Here we find that for dynamic background cover varying in the range $[1-10]\%$, the number of rounds increases with the increase in $pDelay$ from 0.3 to 0.9. The number of rounds is same for both ranges of $[1-10]\%$ and $[45-55]\%$ when the value of $pDelay$ is around 0.5. For dynamic background cover with the range of $[45-55]\%$, the number of rounds decreases with the increase in $pDelay$

from 0.1 to 0.6 and a increase in number of rounds is found when $pDelay$ is increased from 0.6 to 0.9.

2) Comparison with Simple SDA: Simple SDA does not reduce the effect of Alice cover. So with the increase in Alice cover, number of rounds also increases significantly. But SDA-2H reduces the effect of Alice cover. So changing Alice cover does not have significant impact on the number of rounds in this case. In simulations without any background cover, our results stand for the fact that SDA-2H is more powerful than simple SDA and the results hold good for non-dynamic background cover with attacker adjustment (Figure 8). But for dynamic background cover, the number of rounds taken by simple SDA is less than that of SDA-2H (Figure 9).

Once the amount and variability of background cover traffic are sufficiently large, it becomes a difficult task to correctly estimate the amount of Alice cover. At this point, SDA-2H with our simple averaging method for estimating Alice cover becomes error prone and actually distracts from SDA's effectiveness. In practice, the attacker would use whichever attack was most effective for his estimate of the system parameters.

In reality, SDA-2H may not be more powerful than SDA in all the cases, but SDA-2H is an effective attack model to explore the effect of background cover, as it

successfully reduces the effect of Alice Cover.

VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper, we have described and evaluated SDA-2H. We specifically use SDA-2H as a tool to measure the previously unknown effects of background cover on the anonymity of mixed based systems. By using a carefully chosen set of values for our attack simulator (to guarantee maximum coverage of data values) we have finally understood some potential benefits of adding background cover to a mix based system.

We also show how the same background cover traffic can be nullified by a well-informed attacker. Using the information gleaned from these experiments, coupled together with a greater understanding of mixes, we can be one step closer to obtaining the ideal form of anonymous communication, one that is insusceptible to any attack.

Introducing error into the components of the SDA equation has shed light on the anonymity of mixes, though the exact effects have not been explored in a mathematically rigorous way. By returning to the original formulation of [17], we will analyze the effect on the lower bound given for the number of rounds an attacker can expect to take for a varying amount of error in the number of messages. Namely, Danezis gives this lower bound, t (with a given "security parameter", l), as, he also derives a precondition for an attacker's success based on Alice's sending volume, $m < \frac{N}{b-1}$.

Here, if $X = \sqrt{\frac{N-1}{N}(b-1)}$,

and $Y = \sqrt{\frac{N-1}{N^2}(b-1) + \frac{m-1}{m}}$

then, $t > [m \cdot l (X + Y)]^2$

Our continued interest is in understanding the precise effect on these bounds for a given amount of padding, both by Alice and the background; as the equations alone seem not to incorporate the additional information an approach such as SDA-2H provides.

One noted weakness of SDA is that it relies on a relatively Alice-free background against which to make its correlations. Danezis notes, however, that so long as Alice's behavior varies substantially, even a continuous sending pattern does not provide complete anonymity; it would have to abide by certain conditions – which we indend to compare with SDA-2H by varying the three types of cover discussed in section III. We expect that as we approach an equal ammount of inbound and outbound messages, we may come closer to providing better anonymity for all the senders, not just ones that send sufficiently more than their peers.

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